Comments on “Stances: responses to meaningness”
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yellow stripes and dead squirrels
I may have introduced you to RAW, but I think I learned from you to take him more seriously than I would have otherwise.
The bit about Dzogchen is interesting. I ought to have figured that whatever method you have for getting beyond the various dichotomies you outline was going to be a bit more complex and interesting than the mere middle-of-the-road-ness. I’ll look forward to your explanations.
Mike
I wanted to tweet this but it
I wanted to tweet this but it was too long. I think I finally got the thesis you propose in meaningness. Lmk if this misses the mark:
“Eternalism: Universally fixed distinctions. Nihilism: Universally collapsed distinctions. Nebulosity: Pragmatic distinguishing (by someone, for something)”
That is, both eternalism and nihilism fail by taking the one doing the work out of the picture and projecting the work done onto reality. Nebulosity acknowledges that you always have someone doing work for something, and the distinctions (patterns) are relevant to this being.
What?
“That is, both eternalism and nihilism fail by taking the one doing the work out of the picture and projecting the work done onto reality. Nebulosity acknowledges that you always have someone doing work for something, and the distinctions (patterns) are relevant to this being.”
This isn’t even speculative; it just an assertion with no evidence and it’s not even meaningful.
There is always someone doing work for something; how do you eat?
Do you think nihilism results necessarily in death?
If so, I frankly find this a juvenile understanding.
The fact of the matter is, the author is simply wrong.
Nihilism doesn’t universally collapse distinctions; it simply proposes there are no proper classes, to borrow the set theoretic distinction.
There can be all the distinctions you like, there are simply no global classes, no universal class of “meaning” to which we can ascribe things.
You can distinguish a dog and a cat under nihilism; it’s simply that such a distinction does not have some global quantifier of “absolute meaning” ascribable to it.
Which is reality.
Biologically, species aren’t true “things” in the sense of a platonic ideal; they are processes, constantly in motion.
Look at ring species groups, say A-F.
A can reproduce with B, B with C, C with D, etc
But A and D cannot, nor B and E.
Are these all one species? Are they a group of subspecies?
The fact of the matter is “species” is not a coherent global distinction; it only has meaning inside of a context, when we are using it for a purpose.
There is no actual meaning to it; it is useful.
The author seems to deliberately misunderstand this in order to sell us snake oil that they cannot justify except by mischaracterizing other approaches.
Nihilism succeeds where “nebulousness” fails exactly because it is uncompromising: there is no top level, because it is incoherent.
Learn from naive set theory; just because we want things do not make them possible.
What
“There’s the point” as I am amused by a pressing need to ‘settle’ a discussion.
Push back on propositions are welcomed, if only to open the door for necessity validation for one’s stance. Cognitive dissonance is a shifty devil and shows up in a host of forms. “Interesting” as Spock would say, not committing to an understanding based upon, well, limited information.
I get your drift, I appreciate the task, and I relish the thought.
One doesn’t have to be ‘right’ to delve towards understanding
Let’s play nice
Meaningness and the three bears
Hi David, congratulations on launching your site. You have quite a task before you of filling in all the boxes in your schema.
I think that your presentation of the various a/b choices may be a bit too schematic. Maybe I don’t travel in the right circles, but I don’t know any actual nihilists or totally rigid authoritarians. I suppose some people cling tightly to one stance or another, but most of us partake of bits of both depending on circumstances, and try to cobble together our own ad hoc syntheses.
But it’s very valuable to have these dichotomies laid out clearly and (the hard part) have a sketch of how a synthesis might be achieved.
Hm, maybe you could call this the three bears model of meaningness – there’s being too much in one direction (too constrained, too rigid), or the other (too loose) and then there is baby bear’s stance which is just right. For the children’s version.
Speaking of children, here’s one of my efforts to transcend the authority/rebellion dialectic.