Comments on “Preview: eternalism and nihilism”


It's ok to lie

Rin'dzin Pamo's picture

Your post on the different stances mostly focused on ideation, regarding what goes on individually in relation to meaningness. I imagine that, for most of us, this cognitive process is habitual and out of awareness. That led me to think about the stances’ effect on behaviour, how that propels our flip-flopping from one to another - and how it might be a key to recognising our own underlying stances. This could be confusing: behaviours derived from a stance often appear to mean, and are received as their opposite. Someone with an eternalist agenda unintentionally fuels a nihilist response, or dualist action leaves a trail of monism behind it.

If I am looking for Cosmic Meaning in my experience, I begin to believe that every encounter I have must be meaningful in some way. My ability to discern between degrees or types of significance is eroded. The more the trivial becomes meaningful for me, the more someone encountering me is forced to perceive my behaviour as meaningless. Because I need to find meaning in everything, my discriminating perception is eroded and my action appears increasingly random. The more I behave according to an eternalist stance, the more likely I encounter nihilism. So I create around me the model behaviour for my next stance.

On the contrary, someone whose action really is random – because they perceive their encounters as ultimately meaningless – forces meaning despite him or herself. Mersault, the protagonist of Camus' L'Etranger, is a classic example. His apparently random decision to kill taken in the heat of the moment renders everything he says, from then to his death, as significant - for the press, the public, the jurors, the priest, even the reader.

Although the specifics are unpredictable, it seems the mechanics of flip-flopping could be as much due to behavioural patterns of the stances, as cognitive recognition that a position is unworkable. That might have implications for how we figure out our relationship with meaningness.

Monism gives one the excuse to behave badly: if I have a true, transcendent self, by definition that self exists continuously. That makes it ok to lie, for example, without feeling too bad about it (because the me doing the lying is unrepresentative of the Real Me). Every time I lie, my transcendent self still exists, ‘holding’ the non-liar me. So my dishonesty in the moment doesn’t matter – it’s a transitory blip caused by circumstances annoyingly non-confirmatory of my transcendent reality – it’s not the Real Me. It’s impossible to live up to my True Self all the time… attempting to be Monist increases the division between my self-image and my behaviour.

I haven’t quite figured out how Dualist behaviour might force oneness in response. But contrary to Monism, the Dualist perspective seems to give rise to self-consciously virtuous behaviour. Maybe coercing others into receiving one's goodwill is a form of bullying that denies the recipient’s expression of difference?


Interpersonal dynamics of confused stances

This is insightful—I hadn't thought about the instability of stances in terms of interpersonal interactions at all. I think you are right that this must be an important mechanism (and feel slightly stupid not to have recognized this point myself!).

The examples you give are suggestive; I think it would be good to look at a lot more cases of how behavior arising out of the various stances might be perceived and what responses they might provoke.

Lots of opportunities for future research (as every academic grant proposal puts it).


Questions on the "meaning" of your points

First, you fail to support your claim "Meaning is obvious everywhere" and seem to use "obvious" as the tool to avoid clarification. If you use "meaning" to imply definition for the purpose of communication, you dodge the nihilist point. If you use it to refer to "purpose" to existence, you don't actually argue your point.

You argue "[d]enying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" without explaining how beauty implies meaning. Beauty derives from an aesthetically patterned perception aligning with our neurological wiring for pattern-recognition to create pleasure. The process requires no extra meaning. Nor does meaninglessness remove colour perception, emotional response or pattern-recognition.

Virtue and kindness vary by culture, so they don't have a constant meaning. The ability to recognize congruence between a cultural value and a given behaviour don't require anything more than memory and perception.

A life lived moving towards pleasure and away from pain, as our organism has evolved, produces choice and action without requiring meaning. And I include my point about aesthetics as a form of pleasure. An aesthetic pattern can not only occur in nature, but in music, mathematics, social interactions and anywhere patterns can form. For me, paralysis produces unpleasantness (mild pain), so it drives action by causing me to move away from the pain.

So, without getting too complex, I can say a meaningless life can evolve out of moving away from pain and toward pleasure.

The experience of "flow" states, generosity, and kindness can all produce pleasure too, by the way.

And to draw on the popular teaching of Yoda, as well as the more obscure work of Moshe Feldenkrais, "trying" to do anything tires and frustrates, while "doing" unfolds without excess strain or parasitic effort.

I don't necessarily think you don't have a point; I only think you haven't proven it.

Nihilism and its discontents

Hi, Jim—thank you for your comments! Sorry to be a bit slow to reply.

I'm not quite sure how to respond, because I'm not quite sure where you are coming from.

It seems that you hold a naturalistic world-view, which I do too, more-or-less. I believe that everything I write here is compatible with naturalism.

Naturalism can tend to lead to nihilism, but it need not. See the fine work on naturalist spirituality by Tom Clark.

I'm not sure whether you actively advocate nihilism, or if you see it as the only alternative to eternalism, or if you are just pointing out that this page does not refute nihilism.

This page is the introduction to the introduction to the introduction to what will eventually be a huge book. So it doesn't attempt to prove or argue anything; it's just giving some taste for what the central issues are.

One of the central points is that nihilism and eternalism are not the only alternatives. So, I think we would agree that there is no "ultimate" meaning to anything; that would be eternalism. But there are non-ultimate meanings and purposes, which are obvious and undeniable.

Rather than my explaining that in detail here: if you'd like to explore further, I'd suggest reading "Meaningfulness and meaninglessness" and "Extreme examples, eternalism and nihilism."

"Denying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" is not a first-principles deduction; it's an empirical observation. It comes from my own experience of nihilistic depression, my observation of other people in that state, and the clinical literature.

Best wishes,


Another possible (likely) alternative...

ELT's picture

"People disagree about what things mean. Perhaps meanings are just a matter of opinion? Meaning is important enough that this uncertainty is emotionally unacceptable."

"The wrong idea underlying all confused stances is that things must be either definitely meaningful or else effectively meaningless. Or, if meaning is not objective, it must be subjective. But these are not the only possibilities. Completion: meaningness"

"(On the stance of the author's term "meaningness") It is neither given by an external force nor a human invention."

  • Ok, but couldn't the more articulate description be an eternal force WITHIN you? That way it is neither external, nor a human invention - more like, a seed that sprouts, yes? Consider perhaps that "God" can be understood as "Eternal Life Force" that is eternally sprouting life. And for example, the natural disasters, diseases, etc, that are tragedies are a result of a falling out of ideal healthy ecology with the environment and ourselves with what is actually proper for human life, since humans act on the natural world with creative powers. The less conscious we are as a species at interacting with the environment and choosing what we will put in our bodies - due to loss of connection with ourselves and what is truly and emphatically and compellingly needed or wanted - warrants this empirical erosion of healthy body/planet ecology. There is a measure of privilege and responsibility contained within one's own ecology, as an individual and how one moves through a larger collective whole, that really seems to bear most significantly on outcomes. (Sometimes the implications are wonderful!)

This article was worth at least a moment of my consideration, especially how nihilistic I can become learning more about the world.

Wobbling between eternalism and nihilism

Hi, thanks for an interesting comment!

I thought the last few words were the most interesting. Learning more about the world can—and usually does—lead to nihilism, as you come to understand what's wrong with eternalism.

But then, nihilism is also clearly wrong. And, there are clearly aspects of eternalism that are appealing, accurate, and intelligent. In the end, though, both eternalism and nihilism are unworkable and make you miserable.

This book is about a third possibility, that is neither eternalistic nor nihilistic (nor somewhere in-between). That possibility is not well-known, and can be hard to see. As a result, we tend to oscillate between eternalism and nihilism—which seems to be your experience as you've described it here.

The form of eternalism you describe is monist. Monist eternalism sees God impersonally, as a Cosmic Plan or eternal ordering principle that animates the universe. It tends to overemphasize connections and deemphasize specifics.

I've written about monist eternalism in several places, including in a series of historical essays that begin here.

Hi, found it!

Jackson's picture

Hi, found it!
This is an awesome navigation out of fractured post-modernity and all the fucked-upedness that brings, its clarity helped so much, thank you!

Please respond if I've missed the purpose of this discussion however, but monism (as I understand it) is not actually about meaning at all. Surely what eternalism is trying to get at is the clarification of that 'one thing' of monism. Although religion attempts to imbue that with meaning, and nihilism strips it of meaning, meaning is besides the point if that 'one thing' can be proved to be everything.

While scientific materialism is dismissed by the New Agers, and beliefs are dismissed by science, that one thing still goes unexplored.

I think you are closer to it with meaningness and meaninglessness, because that's the debate of projection - if my meaning is different to your meaning, how can meaning be falsified? More than that, what other beliefs may I be projecting? What can I determine as infallible truth?

So to come round to solipsism, if 'I am' is the only thing we can 100% say for certain, it's a short jump from there to monism - true monism:

Truth exists.
Untruth cannot exist, any more than non-being can be etc.
Truth must be absolute.


if truth is all, and consciousness exists, then consciousness is all.

It's a big jump, but the logic is sound, a no-belief required, airtight syllogism. All you have to do is disprove either statement.

I'd be eager to hear your response.

I am reading this homepage

S's picture

I am reading this homepage with interest, and I have two comments:

1) Very different situations are described with the same notions. E.g., if the statement "the cup is full" corresponds to the fact referred to, then we call it true. This situation is common part of our daily experience. In contrast, the statement "god exists" is on a completely different level, and there is no generally acknowledged way how we could verify or falsify.

Therefore, I have doubts that the notion of e.g. truth can be applied uniformly to all kinds of statements on all kinds of levels.

2) As far as I understand you, Eternalism is the position, that there is an absolute reference, e.g. God, and that the corresponding statement "God exists" is true. Nihilism is the position that there is no absolute reference at all, and that all interpretations of the world are relative.

These two positions are both extremes, and both of them have shortcomings, as both of them are based on faith, just in opposite directions. In particular, Nihilism would be the faith that there is no absolute reference.

Referring to bullet point 1) above, I doubt that Nihilism or Eternalism are relevant for our daily experience.

Personally, I find the position of the critical rationalism of Popper intriguing, which assumes that there is an absolute reference as hypothesis, but which also states, that we never can be sure that our statements really represent the truth - instead we have to examine all subjectively formulated statements and evaluate them so as to come as close to the truth as possible.

I would be happy to hear your thoughts!

Thank you,

Truth and relevance

I have doubts that the notion of e.g. truth can be applied uniformly to all kinds of statements on all kinds of levels.

I agree.

These two positions are both extremes, and both of them have shortcomings

Yes, right, that's the starting point for everything in the book.

Nietzsche and the active nihilism of the Übermensch

John's picture

I find it weird that you compare yourself to Nietzsche elsewhere( and yet speak of nihilism only as a passive nihilism of meaninglessness. Ignoring Nietzsche’s active nihilism that accepts the absence of objective meaning, but uses this opportunity to develop a subjective meaningful life.

Also you seem to be stating that Objective/Subjective is a false dichotomy. I would very much like to see some kind of reasoning behind this. How can something simultaneously depend and not depend on a subject?

I seems you were forced to deny this dichotomy because you associate subjectivity with meaninglessness. Which makes no sense; some event could be subjectively meaningless for someone while being the most subjectively meaningful event of my life.

But all in all I don’t think I actually disagree with what you’re trying to say, only with your terminology.

Active nihilism

Yes, Nietzsche is a major influence. Unfortunately, due to his untimely death, he never worked out his positive vision, which might have been similar to what I am working toward here. I have described that as "joyful nihilism," with the caveat that if nihilism is defined as "nothing is meaningful" then this is not really accurate.

The subjective theory of meaning was worked out by the existentialists, among others. They were directly in Nietzsche's philosophical lineage (Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre, basically). Existentialism collapsed around 1960 because it definitely doesn't work. Meaning isn't (only) subjective, and trying to live on that basis leads to nihilism.

Eventually this book will explain that in detail. For now, there's a brief explanation here.

A minor point: to be clear, I would never compare myself with Nietzsche. He was possibly the best philosopher of all time. I only said:

my approach is more similar to those of Nietzsche and Vajrayana Buddhism than to the Western or Buddhist mainstreams.

Response to "Nihilism and its Discontents"

Jim Schubert's picture

Hello David,

I apologize for for my extremely slow response to your response.

I am no longer quite sure where I was coming from, either. I do know it was from curiousity and a desire for clarification. You did provide that.

"I'm not sure whether you actively advocate nihilism, or if you see it as the only alternative to eternalism, or if you are just pointing out that this page does not refute nihilism."

The latter drove my response.

"This page is the introduction to the introduction to the introduction to what will eventually be a huge book. So it doesn't attempt to prove or argue anything; it's just giving some taste for what the central issues are."

That answers my core question.

'"Denying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" is not a first-principles deduction; it's an empirical observation. It comes from my own experience of nihilistic depression, my observation of other people in that state, and the clinical literature.'

I can certainly attest to that. I have a neurological condition which causes biologically-based cycles of severe depression. The depression comes before the sense of meaninglessness for me. And that, for me, leads not to to reality becoming dull grey, but the colours become (subjectively) meaningless. That functionally equates, so I can support your point from the subjective side of a biological base. If that ever proves useful.

I find your work helpful and interesting, and I thank you for sharing it.

Subjectivity and What does ‘meaning’ mean?

John's picture

It seems your main argument against the subjectivity of ‘meaning’ is “If meaningness was merely subjective, it would not be possible to be wrong about it.”

Well this is where you confuse two definitions of the term 'meaning':

1- This is meaningful, as in this has a meaning, an implication.
This means/implies that X is true (i.e. The fact that I am winning this last rounds means/implies that I am loved by the universe, and will thus continue to enjoy good fortune).

This is an objective statement that can be empirically tested. And obviously the result is that the statement is false.

2- This is meaningful, as in this is important, it has significance, it is essential, crucial.

This is subjective and not empirically verifiable.
At most you could empirically verify this objective statement:
“That person finds X meaningful.”

But of course the truth value of this statement has no bearing on the objective meaningfulness of X.

Of course this does not mean that we fall into what you call lite nihilism. Because “nothing means anything” is not the same as “nothing objectively means anything”. The second allows for meaning to exist in all its splendor, but in the subjective realm.

“All meaning is subjective” Does not make meaningful things become any less meaningful. Not unless when you come to this realization you start giving them less meaning, but you don’t have to. You can give them as much meaning as possible.

Subjective meaning

John, eventually I will explain why I think "You can give them as much meaning as possible" is not right. In short, individuals cannot choose how significant thing are. The explanation for that is quite long, so I can't go into detail here. If you are interested, you can read about the reasons existentialism failed, and about (for instance) the ethnomethodological understanding of the situated construction of meaning.

Not actually what I meant : )

John's picture

"In short, individuals cannot choose how significant thing are."

Oh yes I agree, meaning comes from a mix of natural instinct/cultural education/personal experience/emotional state etc.

One would have to have full control of the mind to make oneself find whatever one wanted as meaningful.

But this is irrelevant to my point. That meanings (as in attributions of importance) can’t be right or wrong or empirically tested. This perceived quality is due to a confusion of the definition of ‘meaning’.

I don’t understand how existentialism or its failings have any significance to this.

Existentialism is barely even a thing, more of an ad-hoc title for various philosophers that varied greatly on opinion and focus of topics.

And has little similarity with what I said about subjectivity and joyful nihilist.

It was also pretty gloomy. Angst, dread and despair often took central stage. This again has no resemblance to what I was saying.

In fact existential nihilist Donald A. Crosby disagrees with me; "There is no justification for life, but also no reason not to live. Those who claim to find meaning in their lives are either dishonest or deluded. In either case, they fail to face up to the harsh reality of the human situations".

So to the existential nihilist nothing is meaningful subjectively or otherwise.

I could only find ethnomethodology writings talking about meaning as ‘symbol’ not meaning as ‘importance’. Regardless if the point was about the intersubjective creation of meaning. That doesn’t make meaning any less subjective.

Maybe the problem is with the definition of subjectivity. One may think that if the meaning of something depends both on outside factors and on input from the subject then it is neither objective nor subjective. But this is a misunderstanding of the words.

If something needs no input from a subject (i.e. can exist without a subj.) then it is objective.

If something needs input, no matter how small or constrained from a subject or subjects then it is subjective.

There is no in-between or outside.

Agreeing to disagree

Hmm, I think we are going to have to agree to disagree for the time being. I haven't yet explained my understanding of this, which is a fairly complex analysis, and probably won't get a chance to do that for another couple years at best.

Conversely, your last comment seems to be an argument of the form "the true meaning of these words is what I say it is," which rarely works. Philosophical terms, including "objective" and "subjective," have multiple senses in different contexts, and typically none of them are clear-cut.

An Amazon search immediately shows up several books devoted simply to elucidating various sense of "objectivity," for instance.

Ironically in agreement

John's picture

Actually I think that we agree on the facts; but due to having different personal definitions of the words; the same phrase has different meanings for us both.

It’s all just a matter of terminology/semantics as I said before.

I guess I was just being needlessly pedantic. If you have ever been in that position I’m sure you’ll accept my apologies.

Though I could strongly defend that I am using the mainstream definition. Actually I have never found any other.

The books you mentioned are not so much about the definition of objectivity but about how objectivity as been applied (or attempted to be reached) in the various fields of science. Along with some other books of various themes that simply happen to have the word in the title.

Regardless, I again apologize for the pedantism and will resume the (as of the moment 3) day marathon of reading your writings.

Buddhism and eternalism

I have been reading texts on the sutrayana and vajrayana paths lately, and saw that they both say the purpose of the path is for you to become beneficial to all beings. I know that meaningness is inspired by your Buddhist practices, and I'm trying to understand why that purpose isn't considered eternalistic. It sounds like an absolute purpose in life, a mission. It is not one given to us by a god necessarily, but by a lineage of people who believe it is clearly The Best Thing. Can you help me understand how that is not eternalistic? Thanks!

Buddhism and eternalism

Well-spotted, yes. If "for the benefit of all sentient beings" becomes an absolute, it's definitely eternalistic. And indeed that is common.

Buddhism is a vast sprawling mass of contradictions—a 2000+ year long conversation among millions of humans who were all confused to some degree and who had many divergent ideas and argued about them vigorously. All, or nearly all, of them (and us) were (and are) both eternalistic and nihilistic, in different ways, because those are always the easiest ways of thinking about meaning. It's nearly impossible not to fall into them at times. In fact, according to some definitions, being a Buddha simply means managing to consistently avoid both errors.

As for purpose, generally Hinayana does not see benevolence as the ultimate purpose; the ultimate purpose is to stop yourself from being reborn. (Hinayana is itself a vast sprawling confusion, as are all branches of Buddhism, so it's not altogether consistent about this.) Mahayana made "saving all sentient beings" the ultimate purpose (although again this is not entirely consistent). This is the "bodhisattva ideal." Tantrayana (which is most of Vajrayana) mainly also takes that as the ultimate purpose (although in many texts you get the sense that this is just paying lip service to an official ideology and the authors weren't that interested).

Dzogchen, my main source of conceptual inspiration in Buddhism, goes through all the other branches of Buddhism and points out how they are eternalistic and/or nihilistic. This analysis is useful partly as a series of examples of how you can find these errors in different ways of thinking; and it was my starting point when I began working on Meaningness more than ten years ago.

I haven't looked at the Dzogchen texts in a few years. I don't remember how much detail they go into about the eternalism of the bodhisattva ideal, or even if they discuss purpose at all. (I would guess yes, but locating a relevant passage would take some work.)

In general, Dzogchen was opposed by Tibetan authorities exactly because it pointed out the eternalism of the state religion. They considered it immoral because it relativized the supposed Law of Karma. Strong opposition from the theocratic state meant that Dzogchen authors had to be careful what they said. Especially when it comes to "moral" matters, there's often some beating around the bush.

To come out and say "benevolence is good, by and large, but it's not the ultimate purpose of existence, because there can't be any such thing" would risk death by slow torture. (Benevolently administered by saintly religious authorities, for the benefit of all sentient beings.)

However, that's my view, so I'm glad I don't live in a Buddhist theocracy.

Buddhism & eternalism (continued...)

Thanks for the reply, it's helpful to hear your take. I felt myself getting resistant/cautious when I read the texts proclaiming that purpose, thinking "hm, am I being suckered into another mission?" It's not such a bad mission to be suckered into, it's just the suckering I'm wary of.
It does seem to me that I am generally better behaving towards others when my mind is more calm and spacious, but I'm at the stage where I want that result for my own sake more than for the people around me. I don't like how I feel when I'm overly reactive, and I'm done with it. Bit selfish, perhaps.

A related observation: when I am in altered states, whether from biofeedback/improv/unmentionables, I am not particularly social. I am so enjoying of my own self that I don't feel the need to play with others. I will play with them if they play with me, but I'm happy on my own. Eventually I get anxious when I realize this and think to myself, "oh gosh, humans are supposed to fundamentally want other humans, maybe I shouldn't try to peel off the layers of my self that encourage me to play with other humans."

That leads me to another possible eternalism that I spotted in your Dzogchen comments: "compassion is an inherent, pervasive, unchanging aspect of the basic nature of mind." How do we know that? What if it isn't? Is that another thing where you might say "it is helpful to pretend that compassion is inherent in humans, because holding that belief leads to benevolent actions. Benevolence is good, by and large - but it's not the ultimate purpose of existence, because there can't be any such thing." I'm on board with that. I'm just so damn agnostic about everything that I have a hard time proclaiming 100% that "humans are inherently compassionate." Or even 50%.


I felt myself getting resistant/cautious when I read the texts proclaiming that purpose, thinking "hm, am I being suckered into another mission?"

I think that is wise. Buddhists do frequently turn into eternalistic True Believers when they buy into these claims. This has bad consequences.

I'm at the stage where I want that result for my own sake more than for the people around me.

Yes. The official story is that when you have enough experience of non-reactive mind, you naturally find yourself wanting to help other people experience that too. I found that to be the case for me, but whether the sequence is universal, I have no idea. It seems plausible, but it's an open empirical question. Anyway, the official story is that practicing for your own benefit is the right way to start. So there's no need to feel like you are being selfish in a bad way.

I am so enjoying of my own self that I don't feel the need to play with others.

I believe this is called "introversion," technically :-)

According to my understanding of the Western psychological theory, there's nothing wrong with that, and there's not much you can do to change it, either. (Personally, I wish it were easier for me to switch into extroverted mode when that is more useful, but overall I'm glad to be introverted.)

"compassion is an inherent, pervasive, unchanging aspect of the basic nature of mind."

Mmm... this was a religiously-couched answer to a religiously-couched question. I try to respond in something close to a question's conceptual framework.

From an evopsych point of view—maybe that's a more congenial framework for you?—compassion is a basic evolved function that everyone shares and that is always potentially available. This is uncontroversial in Western psychology, I think? (Leaving aside sociopathy and severe brain damage as potential sources of exceptions.) Of course aggression is also a basic evolved function that everyone shares and that is always potentially available. One deploys one or the other more-or-less skilfully, according to situational cues.

This is not actually different from the Buddhist view (including the Dzogchen view) except perhaps for moral valuation. But mostly the West views compassion as morally preferable to aggression, too.

The Dzogchen view might differ with the evopsych one in that it would say that compassion is "more natural" than aggression, in a specific technical sense. Dzogchen would agree that aggression is built-in potential in everyone, so that's "natural" in the ordinary sense. For Dzogchen, "the natural state of mind" is that in which one is not doing eternalism or nihilism. But this is of course rare, so it's not "natural" in an ordinary sense.

Buddhism & eternalism (the finale)

Okay, I am on board with all of that. I can get behind both the philosophical and scientifically-grounded belief that compassion is a feature of the human brain, as long as it's also agreed that less morally agreeable aspects like aggression are also features. And I believe that aggression is often misused and overused these days.

The whole introverted thing is a whole other discussion, as I tend to think I'm either an extrovert with social anxiety or an introvert who loves being the center of attention. It may be that even in my altered states, there's a layer of social anxiety that has yet to be peeled off. I'll report back in a year.

New! Improved! With nihilist flag

You are right, that was lazy. (Or, was the best I could do ten years ago when I first published this page.)

I've replaced the anarchist symbol with the official nihilist flag.

(I'm not sure where that came from!)

Black or white

Nikos's picture


Although i am sure you mean well and this way of thinking is another defensive mechanism for helping people with the nature of Existence, this theory is not actually working. Unfortunately, the reality of the situation is either black or white. Everything looks grey until we have deciphered it enough (i don't pretend to have deciphered it enough myself). There is an objective truth nomatter if it is positive or negative for our minds. If there is meaning to the smallest thing or event in this universe then there is cosmic meaning behind everything. Otherwise meaninglessness is the truth. It does not matter what i believe (it is simply another axiomatic faith and everyone has his own), but the fact is that either meaning exists or futility is the truth. We cannot escape that realization although it is a scary one.
Hope you are well and all the best for you in this fight of existence we found ourselves trapped in.

Absurdism Re-Stated

Walter's picture

Yes, what Niko said. Your unstated major premise is that life has some inherent value, that it's "good." I refer you to Hume's is/ought problem.

Sorry to butt in. David will

LPalmer's picture

Sorry to butt in. David will probably give a better response.

I don't think he's ever once suggested here, tacitly or otherwise, that life has some inherent value (that would be eternalistic). His discussion also attempts to sidestep the question of whether "life is good".

All he's arguing for is a pragmatic acceptance that meaning, as experienced by agents in their interactions with the world, actually exists. (The very idea that we can ask such a question such as "is life good or bad?" would appear to suggest that the asker acknowledges this to be the case.)

There was a really good discussion in one of his metablog posts called 'Reasons to be Cheerless' a while back which dealt with these slippery boundaries between nihilism, absurdism and pessimism. It's worth finding.

Someday, probably!

Thank you, LPalmer, that was helpful! Especially since I wasn't planning on replying to Nikos and Walter anytime soon.

"Reasons to be cheerless" attempted to collect all the arguments in favor of nihilism. At the time I wrote it, I thought I was just about to write up a comprehensive refutation. That will need a month of full-time work, which I thought I would have, but something interfered, and I didn't get to write it, and now don't know when I will get another month. Nor whether nihilism is the best thing to work on when I do!

The thing about arguments for nihilism is that none of them work, but there are a few dozen of them, and no one ever seems to have explained thoroughly why each fails. So, when you are in the grip of nihilism, if you are arguing for it, and someone points out that the reason you are adducing is nonsense, you just switch to another, and so on until eventually they get bored and go away.

Once I've written out the complete list of arguments, and why each is wrong, then when someone shows up and says "If there is meaning to the smallest thing or event in this universe then there is cosmic meaning behind everything," I can say "yeah, that's #16, go read why it wrong."

Until I've done that, replying to committed nihilists would entail writing up bits of the month-long discussion piecemeal, which would be inefficient for all of us.

Absurdism Re-Stated

Walter's picture

"Committed nihilists?" I sincerely expected more nuance. I'm genuinely disappointed.

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This page is in the section Why meaningness?.

The next page in this section is What is meaningness?.

The previous page is An appetizer: purpose.

This page’s topics are Eternalism, Meaningness, Nihilism, and Starting points.

General explanation: Meaningness is a hypertext book (in progress), plus a “metablog” that comments on it. The book begins with an appetizer. Alternatively, you might like to look at its table of contents, or some other starting points. Classification of pages by topics supplements the book and metablog structures. Terms with dotted underlining (example: meaningness) show a definition if you click on them. Pages marked with ⚒ are still under construction. Copyright ©2010–2017 David Chapman.