Your post on the different stances mostly focused on ideation, regarding what goes on individually in relation to meaningness. I imagine that, for most of us, this cognitive process is habitual and out of awareness. That led me to think about the stances’ effect on behaviour, how that propels our flip-flopping from one to another - and how it might be a key to recognising our own underlying stances. This could be confusing: behaviours derived from a stance often appear to mean, and are received as their opposite. Someone with an eternalist agenda unintentionally fuels a nihilist response, or dualist action leaves a trail of monism behind it.
If I am looking for Cosmic Meaning in my experience, I begin to believe that every encounter I have must be meaningful in some way. My ability to discern between degrees or types of significance is eroded. The more the trivial becomes meaningful for me, the more someone encountering me is forced to perceive my behaviour as meaningless. Because I need to find meaning in everything, my discriminating perception is eroded and my action appears increasingly random. The more I behave according to an eternalist stance, the more likely I encounter nihilism. So I create around me the model behaviour for my next stance.
On the contrary, someone whose action really is random – because they perceive their encounters as ultimately meaningless – forces meaning despite him or herself. Mersault, the protagonist of Camus' L'Etranger, is a classic example. His apparently random decision to kill taken in the heat of the moment renders everything he says, from then to his death, as significant - for the press, the public, the jurors, the priest, even the reader.
Although the specifics are unpredictable, it seems the mechanics of flip-flopping could be as much due to behavioural patterns of the stances, as cognitive recognition that a position is unworkable. That might have implications for how we figure out our relationship with meaningness.
Monism gives one the excuse to behave badly: if I have a true, transcendent self, by definition that self exists continuously. That makes it ok to lie, for example, without feeling too bad about it (because the me doing the lying is unrepresentative of the Real Me). Every time I lie, my transcendent self still exists, ‘holding’ the non-liar me. So my dishonesty in the moment doesn’t matter – it’s a transitory blip caused by circumstances annoyingly non-confirmatory of my transcendent reality – it’s not the Real Me. It’s impossible to live up to my True Self all the time… attempting to be Monist increases the division between my self-image and my behaviour.
I haven’t quite figured out how Dualist behaviour might force oneness in response. But contrary to Monism, the Dualist perspective seems to give rise to self-consciously virtuous behaviour. Maybe coercing others into receiving one's goodwill is a form of bullying that denies the recipient’s expression of difference?
This is insightful—I hadn't thought about the instability of stances in terms of interpersonal interactions at all. I think you are right that this must be an important mechanism (and feel slightly stupid not to have recognized this point myself!).
The examples you give are suggestive; I think it would be good to look at a lot more cases of how behavior arising out of the various stances might be perceived and what responses they might provoke.
Lots of opportunities for future research (as every academic grant proposal puts it).
First, you fail to support your claim "Meaning is obvious everywhere" and seem to use "obvious" as the tool to avoid clarification. If you use "meaning" to imply definition for the purpose of communication, you dodge the nihilist point. If you use it to refer to "purpose" to existence, you don't actually argue your point.
You argue "[d]enying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" without explaining how beauty implies meaning. Beauty derives from an aesthetically patterned perception aligning with our neurological wiring for pattern-recognition to create pleasure. The process requires no extra meaning. Nor does meaninglessness remove colour perception, emotional response or pattern-recognition.
Virtue and kindness vary by culture, so they don't have a constant meaning. The ability to recognize congruence between a cultural value and a given behaviour don't require anything more than memory and perception.
A life lived moving towards pleasure and away from pain, as our organism has evolved, produces choice and action without requiring meaning. And I include my point about aesthetics as a form of pleasure. An aesthetic pattern can not only occur in nature, but in music, mathematics, social interactions and anywhere patterns can form. For me, paralysis produces unpleasantness (mild pain), so it drives action by causing me to move away from the pain.
So, without getting too complex, I can say a meaningless life can evolve out of moving away from pain and toward pleasure.
The experience of "flow" states, generosity, and kindness can all produce pleasure too, by the way.
And to draw on the popular teaching of Yoda, as well as the more obscure work of Moshe Feldenkrais, "trying" to do anything tires and frustrates, while "doing" unfolds without excess strain or parasitic effort.
I don't necessarily think you don't have a point; I only think you haven't proven it.
Hi, Jim—thank you for your comments! Sorry to be a bit slow to reply.
I'm not quite sure how to respond, because I'm not quite sure where you are coming from.
It seems that you hold a naturalistic world-view, which I do too, more-or-less. I believe that everything I write here is compatible with naturalism.
Naturalism can tend to lead to nihilism, but it need not. See the fine work on naturalist spirituality by Tom Clark.
I'm not sure whether you actively advocate nihilism, or if you see it as the only alternative to eternalism, or if you are just pointing out that this page does not refute nihilism.
This page is the introduction to the introduction to the introduction to what will eventually be a huge book. So it doesn't attempt to prove or argue anything; it's just giving some taste for what the central issues are.
One of the central points is that nihilism and eternalism are not the only alternatives. So, I think we would agree that there is no "ultimate" meaning to anything; that would be eternalism. But there are non-ultimate meanings and purposes, which are obvious and undeniable.
"Denying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" is not a first-principles deduction; it's an empirical observation. It comes from my own experience of nihilistic depression, my observation of other people in that state, and the clinical literature.
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Comments
It's ok to lie
26 Oct 2010
Your post on the different stances mostly focused on ideation, regarding what goes on individually in relation to meaningness. I imagine that, for most of us, this cognitive process is habitual and out of awareness. That led me to think about the stances’ effect on behaviour, how that propels our flip-flopping from one to another - and how it might be a key to recognising our own underlying stances. This could be confusing: behaviours derived from a stance often appear to mean, and are received as their opposite. Someone with an eternalist agenda unintentionally fuels a nihilist response, or dualist action leaves a trail of monism behind it.
If I am looking for Cosmic Meaning in my experience, I begin to believe that every encounter I have must be meaningful in some way. My ability to discern between degrees or types of significance is eroded. The more the trivial becomes meaningful for me, the more someone encountering me is forced to perceive my behaviour as meaningless. Because I need to find meaning in everything, my discriminating perception is eroded and my action appears increasingly random. The more I behave according to an eternalist stance, the more likely I encounter nihilism. So I create around me the model behaviour for my next stance.
On the contrary, someone whose action really is random – because they perceive their encounters as ultimately meaningless – forces meaning despite him or herself. Mersault, the protagonist of Camus' L'Etranger, is a classic example. His apparently random decision to kill taken in the heat of the moment renders everything he says, from then to his death, as significant - for the press, the public, the jurors, the priest, even the reader.
Although the specifics are unpredictable, it seems the mechanics of flip-flopping could be as much due to behavioural patterns of the stances, as cognitive recognition that a position is unworkable. That might have implications for how we figure out our relationship with meaningness.
Monism gives one the excuse to behave badly: if I have a true, transcendent self, by definition that self exists continuously. That makes it ok to lie, for example, without feeling too bad about it (because the me doing the lying is unrepresentative of the Real Me). Every time I lie, my transcendent self still exists, ‘holding’ the non-liar me. So my dishonesty in the moment doesn’t matter – it’s a transitory blip caused by circumstances annoyingly non-confirmatory of my transcendent reality – it’s not the Real Me. It’s impossible to live up to my True Self all the time… attempting to be Monist increases the division between my self-image and my behaviour.
I haven’t quite figured out how Dualist behaviour might force oneness in response. But contrary to Monism, the Dualist perspective seems to give rise to self-consciously virtuous behaviour. Maybe coercing others into receiving one's goodwill is a form of bullying that denies the recipient’s expression of difference?
Rin'dzin
Interpersonal dynamics of confused stances
31 Oct 2010
This is insightful—I hadn't thought about the instability of stances in terms of interpersonal interactions at all. I think you are right that this must be an important mechanism (and feel slightly stupid not to have recognized this point myself!).
The examples you give are suggestive; I think it would be good to look at a lot more cases of how behavior arising out of the various stances might be perceived and what responses they might provoke.
Lots of opportunities for future research (as every academic grant proposal puts it).
David
Questions on the "meaning" of your points
22 Mar 2012
First, you fail to support your claim "Meaning is obvious everywhere" and seem to use "obvious" as the tool to avoid clarification. If you use "meaning" to imply definition for the purpose of communication, you dodge the nihilist point. If you use it to refer to "purpose" to existence, you don't actually argue your point.
You argue "[d]enying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" without explaining how beauty implies meaning. Beauty derives from an aesthetically patterned perception aligning with our neurological wiring for pattern-recognition to create pleasure. The process requires no extra meaning. Nor does meaninglessness remove colour perception, emotional response or pattern-recognition.
Virtue and kindness vary by culture, so they don't have a constant meaning. The ability to recognize congruence between a cultural value and a given behaviour don't require anything more than memory and perception.
A life lived moving towards pleasure and away from pain, as our organism has evolved, produces choice and action without requiring meaning. And I include my point about aesthetics as a form of pleasure. An aesthetic pattern can not only occur in nature, but in music, mathematics, social interactions and anywhere patterns can form. For me, paralysis produces unpleasantness (mild pain), so it drives action by causing me to move away from the pain.
So, without getting too complex, I can say a meaningless life can evolve out of moving away from pain and toward pleasure.
The experience of "flow" states, generosity, and kindness can all produce pleasure too, by the way.
And to draw on the popular teaching of Yoda, as well as the more obscure work of Moshe Feldenkrais, "trying" to do anything tires and frustrates, while "doing" unfolds without excess strain or parasitic effort.
I don't necessarily think you don't have a point; I only think you haven't proven it.
Nihilism and its discontents
24 Mar 2012
Hi, Jim—thank you for your comments! Sorry to be a bit slow to reply.
I'm not quite sure how to respond, because I'm not quite sure where you are coming from.
It seems that you hold a naturalistic world-view, which I do too, more-or-less. I believe that everything I write here is compatible with naturalism.
Naturalism can tend to lead to nihilism, but it need not. See the fine work on naturalist spirituality by Tom Clark.
I'm not sure whether you actively advocate nihilism, or if you see it as the only alternative to eternalism, or if you are just pointing out that this page does not refute nihilism.
This page is the introduction to the introduction to the introduction to what will eventually be a huge book. So it doesn't attempt to prove or argue anything; it's just giving some taste for what the central issues are.
One of the central points is that nihilism and eternalism are not the only alternatives. So, I think we would agree that there is no "ultimate" meaning to anything; that would be eternalism. But there are non-ultimate meanings and purposes, which are obvious and undeniable.
Rather than my explaining that in detail here: if you'd like to explore further, I'd suggest reading "Meaningfulness and meaninglessness" and "Extreme examples, eternalism and nihilism."
"Denying meaning blinds one to beauty, making all reality dull gray" is not a first-principles deduction; it's an empirical observation. It comes from my own experience of nihilistic depression, my observation of other people in that state, and the clinical literature.
Best wishes,
David
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