Comments on “Natural misunderstandings of adult stage theory”

Let’s take physics or math, traditional subjects that entail high abstractions.

Since “Stages are ways of being, not subject matters”, is it possible to do extremely well in subjects of high abstractions such as math, and physics but still be in stage 3 cognitively speaking with regards to these subject matters?

if so, what does it look like?

i speculate that that people who do well in such high abstraction subjects but still are in stage 3 cognitively, are doing so because they have somehow reify (make concrete) these abstractions.

Conversely, I wonder people who do well in subject areas where there’s low abstraction but high in concrete-ness, and they are at stage 4 competence with regards to these subject areas… is that even possible?

if so, i wonder what that looks like?

I speculate they may be acting according to some honed intuition which they may be unable to describe adequately. I speculate they are aware of this intuition/sensation when they exercise it, but they are unable to explain well.

Reading this brings a feeling of relief, gratitude, groundedness, understanding, integration, love. Not that I didn’t understand this all before, but it’s always great to have someone else lay it out, thank you David! And to be reminded not to deny or avoid or excuse oneself from developing the neglected parts of the 3rd order consciousness.

It’s interesting that you see suppressing at least some emotions when it comes to relationships, because of principle, as being systematic about them. Being systematic about interpersonal stuff just makes me think of machiavellianism, and adhering to principles doesn’t actually strike me as rational, I suppose because I believe reason eventually leads to nihilism. If being systematic about relationships just means being principled, I’m fine with that, but “systematic” does not seem to be such a good word for describing that.

As to meta-systematicity, it’s so hazy trying to apply that at the level of government and institutions. We cling to systems and procedures there because of the illusion of stability and fairness they provide, and trying to move beyond that just seems like a very hard sell, because it will outwardly look so airy-fairy, like you can’t trust the institutions because they will be arbitrary in a way, and especially in government, it will even look autocratic, like some dictator deciding by fiat how things are going to be.

Someone really needs to sketch out how system 5 shakes out at that level, and funnily enough, Curtis Yarvin may be doing just that with his dream of the hyper-competent CEO-monarch.

there’s been quite a lot in applying stage 5 understanding in organizational management. So I am hopeful.

Interesting. Where might I read more on that?

A government becoming an open space of dynamic potential where different governance systems (and everything else) interact reminds me a lot of Scott Alexander’s idea of Archipelago

https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/06/07/archipelago-and-atomic-communitarianism/

I don’t know that it’s perfect - specifically, I don’t see Archipelago having a “meta-government” that favors different island governments for different purposes. The whole proposal sounds like an attempt at minimum-viable-societal-fabric to let the islands coexist peacefully. But perhaps that’s just the dissolution of the self into the needful space creation and evolution support?

In any event - thank you David for this very welcome aide to helping better understand stage theory! This was great not only on the object level but in going back to read the linked, older posts, and noticing new things in them that may not have landed fully the first time.

Hi David, thanks for coming back to this and the rest of your work. I’m having a flu & maybe Covid day but want to put down a marker here without too much detail. I hope this is useful and not too contentious.

Kegan’s first book was The Evolving Self, the second “In Over Our Heads” dealt specifically with the emotional difficulties arising from conflicting (eg in Stage 3) self-definition via group identification: a specific example was the newly married dude who was highly conflicted when his marriage’s needs conflicted with those arising from his intense identification with his family-of-origin. (see also Murray Bowen on Differentiation).

While the growing ability to handle systematic and meta-systematic implications is strongly implicated, my understanding of the heart of the theory was the development of the “person” through their implicit self-definition identification with wider and more differentiated environments and perspectives.

In Object Relations terminology, they see/build themselves through a wider variety of self-objects, and, viz your piece on Kegan and Buddhist Ethics, perceived themselves, therefore, more universally morally obligated.

The transformation can be at least partially glimpsed through the person’s ideas of how “rightness” can be assessed. Broadly, in Stage 2 I’ll tell you what’s right (see D Trump Esq), in Stage 3 we will tell you what’s right (church, CCP, …), Stage 4 I’ll take your ideas on board but I reserve the right to differ with you, Stage 5 (???) we can work together to establish a means of determining rightness in ways that are appropriate to our common situation.

These transformations of who I feel myself to be and who/what I am in the world most definitely support greater systematicity and meta-systematicity. I’ve found a useful addition perspective to be Michael Basseches’ research on “dialectical” thought in University students which informed Otto Laske’s application of a mash-up (Sorry, Otto) of these two flakes of the kaleidoscope in which we arise.

Warm Regards,
Simon Mundy

Just from the hip, I got the impression that catholic faith has quite the potential to integrate people of all stages in a common effort to improve human flourishing on earth. No monopoly on it, maybe, but still well entrenched in some parts. It`s not only dualist eternalism but it can be that for those who need it.

Hi David. Maybe “missed” is unwisely black/white. What does strike me is your emphasis early in your piece on the cognitive aspects of the theory, and the later inclusion, as you talk about Stages 4 & 5 of reference to “self”, back to which I’ll come. So I’d like to move through some observations that may clarify the point I’m trying to develop which, briefly put, I think is the conflation of the development of cognitive breadth with the development of socio-emotional breadth.

That these two are separate though mutually conditioning is, I think, what I’m calling the missing aspect in your explanation. Each one being an aspect of a dialectical, self-transforming (sub-)process

Cognitive Development vs Socio-Emotional Development.

Laske criticised Kegan for conflating these two domains in his stages and therefore Laske insisted on splitting them out in his “Hidden Dimensions” opus. In his assessment process, Laske also included a psychological assessment of neuroticism/psychoticism which he saw as a limiting factor for both socio-emotional and cognitive development.

The conflation and the reservations about psychological (dys-)function are particularly relevant to your statement that “You can be a malignant psychopath at any developmental stage.”

I strongly doubt that this is so with regard to socio-emotional development, as a psychopathological self-model entails at least that a) I am the sole decider of what is right and b) my interests are the sole centre of my interest in the world. This is at best Kegan Stage 2, per my previous comment. One can be a malignant psychopath with very advanced cognitive development (in particular domains), however, where I-psychopath sees domains as irrelevant to their interests, they will be unable/unlikely to see or admit their influences on the domains in which they are interested and competent.

This reservation about the effect on stage development of the extremes of malignant psychopathy applies also to the phenomenology typical of various “personality disorders” and even to the less dysfunctional neuroticisms that psychotherapists often work with in their clients. These, through fear/trauma-based limits on what it is personally acceptable to think/feel/do, manifest as rigidities of self-perception that put off-limits changes that threaten self-as-currently-lived. These changes and losses of who-I-feel-I-am are, as you point out, an inevitable cost of stage transitions.

Definitions and Descriptions
I’d also differ with your early definition of Kegan’s Stage theory.
1. You say “Stages are qualitatively distinct ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and acting that apply in every domain.”
1. As you point out, they CAN apply in every domain and can and do in fact manifest differently, at different levels in the same individual in different domains.
2. You say “Adult stage theory is about how we relate with systems. It’s just about that. That is its topic.”
1. Kegan (and Laske) seem to me to define it as a systematic view of how we feel/see/identify ourselves in relation to (aspects of) our experienced world, cognitive and, particularly, relational. Unless I’m badly misunderstanding your point, it is definitely not “just” about our relations with systems.
2. The cognitive aspect of this development is about our ability to perceive, accept and apply systematic and meta-systematic conceptualising (”dialectical” thought in Laske’s and Basseches’ terms, perhaps).
3. The socio-emotional aspect is about the progressive release of reliance on a perceived specialness of our experience of self and how we define/are-defined-by, and/or how we limit/are-limited-by it.
1. Moi
2. L’etat c’est moi
3. We are the People/Culture.
4. Our individually held views (which may or may not be systematic or meta-systematic) comprise the culture.
5. 😊 I give up, we each and all, with the state, are a dialectically self- and mutually-transforming (far from equilibrium) (DSMT(FFE)) system, among, and as aspects of, other DSMT(FFE) systems.
STEM v Romanticism is a conflict over content, not a stage difference. STEM and Romantic self-identifications have in common their adherence to and identification with a particular way of looking at, being in and speaking about the world. Their Staginess (Kegan 3) is the internal, group commonality; they are NOT differentiated, in Kegan stage, by the content of their worldview. They both, in heir undifferentiated Stage 3 manifestations, tend to feel superior on the basis of their group identity and its way of being/thinking; so do those who personally identify as Catholics, Moslems, Buddhists, Yankee supporters, opera lovers, atheists, Republicans, Democrats, etc. etc. Again, I’m not implying that any of these groupings (or definitions of “us”) are deficient in their Keganity, only that Kegan level is about members’ individual identification as “one-of-us” and a rigidity of interaction conditioned thereby.

Again, it ain’t the content, it’s the belonging, the me-as-one-of-us who think/say/believe/do THIS. The contemporary echo of the nearly universally documented tendency of peoples with little contact with the modern world to think of and refer to themselves as The People. And the rest of us as The Others, Barbarians, Infidels, etc. (with or without the capitalisation 😊).

I can’t be the first person to have noticed this, but there is a close correspondence between Kegan stages and VGR’s Gervais Principle theory:

• Stage 3: Losers
• Stage 4: Clueless
• Stage 5: Sociopaths

That is, if the system in question is the rules of a workplace, the losers are those who live within the rules but are not particularly invested in them (emotional/personal level), the clueless are those who have risen in the organization and take the rules seriously and try to dutifully uphold them (systemic level), whereas the sociopaths are emotionally outside the rules and manipulate them for their own advantage (metasystemic level).

I’m probably doing violence to both theories but this leaped out at me suddenly. And as I said, I can’t be the first to notice the correspondence but googling didn’t turn up much.

First, I want to say, I’m glad I commented and subscribed to the updates in the comments. I am learning so much .

My main point (or rather question is) referring to Simon Mundy and David Chapman’s Lag comment about the use of the term “psychopaths”

I wonder if you both or either of you mean it in the narrow psychopathy as part of the dark triad definition.

Or just in general, broadly.

Because I can see how heading organizations require you to actually have or emulate machiavellian or narcissistic traits.

I wrote about this already briefly in response to Chapman who tweeted his Lag comment in twitter.

Machiavellianism (M going forward) probably (I am unsure) correlate with getting things done and achieving goals

Narcissim (N going forward) probably (again, un sure) correlate at getting people to like you. Easier to get people do work when they like you in an organization.

I am inspired by the argument made by Brian Klaas made here who used the narrow sense of the term “psycopathy” and also thinks we can think about Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy in isolation

And as he points out, you can have M or N “at elevated levels in isolation”.

I also can see how someone at lower stages of development, someone who is at higher stage (say stage 5) can appear to be psychopath to someone at lower stage without actually being one.

I also am unsure even if these dark triad are objectively true or they are just “interactively” true in the words of Chapman (cannot find the right reference. so based on recall)

In that case, what we call psychopathy (broad or otherwise), M, or N, are really just a constellation of traits / symptoms / features.

Which of course makes me wonder if the same can be said of stage 3/4/5.

Carlos Ramírez:

As to meta-systematicity, it’s so hazy trying to apply that at the level of government and institutions.

I was recently introduced to the term “polycentric governance” in an essay about internet governance by Robin Berjon and I think this is relevant here:
https://berjon.com/w3c-governance/

Modern governments tend to be systematic but univeralist; within their domain, they consider themselves the final authority on all things (although in practice they devolve almost everything to smaller scale bodies). States are the final authority within their territory. Corporate executive bodies are the final authority within their company. The Vatican (as earthbound rep of the Big G) is the final authority in Catholicism.

The internet is a fascinating exception. There are many bodies that govern different bits of the internet; the ITU governs the telecommunications networks it depends on, the IETF governs network protocols, W3C governs web protocols, ICANN governs the distribution of IP addresses and domain names, and so on. Each of these entities is highly systematic, with an elaborate system of rules and procedures. They all depend on each others’ work in different ways, but it’s impossible to diagram a traditional nested hierarchy, where any one is fully in charge of any of the others. This is what Berjon describes as “polycentric”.

I think this is a fantastic practical example of a meta-systematic approach to government.

We tend to conceptualize government departments and other public service entities as all answering to “The Government”, ie the legislature, or maybe the executive, or maybe even the judiciary (in the form of Courts Supreme) depending on who you ask. But even the separation of powers in modern republic structures points to some level of meta-systematic thinking. Imagine if we took this further. Imagine we allowed each public service entity to be the final authority on matters within its domain - with its own mechanisms for democratic accountability - similar to the same way the internet is governed.

I’m not sure that “the internet” and “the set of standards bodies that define and regulate aspects of global digital communications via the internet” are synonymous.

I also can’t tell if this is your point? 😅

I’m noticing that, yes, humans use singular nouns like “the government” and “the internet,” and that in so doing, there is an inherent “totalizing/univeralizing” implication. What I can’t tell is whether “the government” and “the internet” are the same kind of singular noun. One’s trying, almost, to describe an agenty body. The other’s trying to encapsulate a very nebulous set of concepts.

For instance, you’re right that the W3C maintains web standards, but is “the web” “the internet?” If the W3C dissolved tomorrow, would it still be “the internet”? How high up are we raising pinkies, here?

Put another way, I could say “the earth” or “politics” as my less agenty noun, and then yes - both of those are comprised of many different governing bodies, each a systematic entity with its own rules and procedures.

In other words, nouns seem “monocentric” or “polycentric” based predominantly on whether, by definition or interpretation, we want to see them that way.

I think the point you’re trying to make is “what if ‘the government’ was arranged more like ‘the internet’?” And I think what I’m trying to say is - if you squint hard enough, or shift your interpretation to “government”, then by and large it already is?

Let’s get the obligatory geek pedantry out of the way first…

you’re right that the W3C maintains web standards, but is “the web” “the internet?”

No, it definitely isn’t. Technically speaking, “the web” is a service that runs on top of “the net”, just like email, Gopher, IRC, FTP, XMPP chat, BitTorrent, Gemini, native mobile apps, and a whole galaxy of IoT devices, none of which are part of “the web”. For clarity, if you use a FarceBook app on your mobile, you are using “the net”, but not “the web”.

Roughly speaking, “the web” consists of everything you can access using a web browser. This includes web apps that connect to servers for many of the aforementioned, but the underlying services use protocols defined by the IETF, or other bodies, not the W3C.

Bringing it back to governance, “the web” is nested entirely within “the net”, but, the W3C (who define web protocols) are not nested within the IETF (who define net protocols).

Now, with those hairs successfully split …

I think the point you’re trying to make is “what if ‘the government’ was arranged more like ‘the internet’?” And I think what I’m trying to say is - if you squint hard enough, or shift your interpretation to “government”, then by and large it already is?

As I understand David and Keengan’s analysis of stage theory, the difference is not in how things are, but in how they appear from the POV of different stages.

So in stage 4, it’s natural to see a government as a single, unified system (including the UN, which definitely isn’t), and to be somewhat mystified by how the internet is governed. I think the common assumption stage 4 assumption is that either some entity like the IEFT or ICANN governs the net, or that tech corporations do (they don’t, although the bigger ones could be seen as part of its polycentric governance). Your first sentence in the quote would be typical of a stage 4 attempt to think meta-systematically. Your second sentence would be the read deal.

I’m just thinking out loud here. Very interested in what David (and others) think of all this.

Thanks for writing this David.

“I’m stuck back in stage 3 in the domains of emotions and relationships, although I’m at stage 4 or later in the domains of abstract thought and systems manipulation.”

I picked up that this might apply to me when I read it but only last night realized in a felt sense that, yes, it does. Specifically it became clear to me that while I can emulate formal asymmetric interactions, on the level of relationships I relate to my boss and coworkers in terms of it being a clique. With my boss being my boss not on a formal basis but on the basis of his higher emotional investment and broader spectrum of competence. The same applies to my previous jobs.

An overall context for these discussions (and I think in David; Meaningness?): All models are wrong. Some models are useful for particular people in particular circumstances. That’s Mundy’s extension to Box’s Theorem. :-)

It’s my strong impression from psychology research and psychotherapy practice that regarding any description of human psychology, whether in first, second or third person as “a thing”, is misleading.

All of these “things” we’re talking about here, Kegan levels, psychological categories and “conditions” are human capabilities and characteristics that pretty much all arise in their own (collection of) spectra in particular individuals. Examples of spectra here include:
1) the various “domains” in which the Kegan levels may be said to be active
2) the different mixes of emotional/affective resonance we see in folks (including myself) “on the ASD spectrum”
3) the different domains of psychopathy exhibited by individuals, e.g. the rational executive at work who is the coercive controller at home.
4) ....

In specific example, there are multiple varieties of “autism” or “Aspergers” depending on the particular neurology of the individual. As kimsia suggests, this also seems true of psychopathy, Machiavelianism, compassion, empathy, and on and on.

It also seems true that anyone, we all, may appear to be any of those from another’s particular perspective, but may not be diagnosable.

These are all social/(more-or-less)scientific constructs through which we interpret the behaviour of others. The robustness of the constructs can partially be assessed via the consistency of agreement across multiple qualified folks in regard to particular examples. See DSM as a counter-example.

An executive at any level needs to be able to take decisions that will adversely impact people, perhaps severely, and also needs to be able, given that they are working with fellow humans, need to be able to appear to be working at different levels of motivation (Machiavellian).

I can say from experience that a psychotherapist may also need or find it efficacious to work from a hidden agenda with a particular client in a particular situation. A favourite in our practice here is something like: “OK, great! You’ve understood that. You need now to internalise it. DON’T try this at home.” Yeah, right! :-)

Some folks have very constrained internal choices; they can ONLY work AGAINST those around them (probably a la Trump) and it’s those that we are entitled, given the agreement mentioned above, to see as pathological.

Is this helpful?

Which is why I think in this case it might be useful to some people to treat the term “psycopath” narrowly.

Let me explain.

When someone is on the verge of breaking into the higher stages, but stops themselves from doing so for fear of being perceived as “psycopath”, then it’s useful to use the narrow definition to prevent this self-sabotage.

Note: a higher stage does not inherently make you a better person. See https://meaningness.com/misunderstanding-stage-theory#superior

You’re just at a different stage in growth as per the argument in the original article.

Not to force a yes/no answer. You don’t have to answer if you don’t want to.

Out of pure curiosity, when you first wrote about psycopathy in the original comment, did you use it in a general, layman, broad sense?

I’m glad to see all this conversation here, as it teases out some of the deeper misunderstandings. Indeed, when one has a misunderstanding, I find it very helpful to express it explicitly, but without violence, inviting other perspectives.

I just wanted to add a little nuance here. While there is a perspective in which it makes perfect sense to say “All models are wrong“, there’s something that to me feels implicit in the choice of words. The sense I have is that is close to saying “you’re wrong!” in a discussion, which is a mistake that I sometimes still make, despite being aware of it. Generally, I find it leads to people taking up an antagonistic stance, which isn’t going to get far in terms of finding common ground — and I don’t mean common ground in terms of sameness, I mean common ground in terms of having shared language in which to talk about differences.

Saying that all models are incomplete seems almost tautological to me. But for most models I can think of, there is at least one context in which that model is useful. So why call it “wrong”? Maybe it is more helpful, in conversation, to spell out the characteristics of the context in which it is useful.

And similarly, back to stages. There are contexts in which “earlier” stage thinking and behaviour is useful. Thus I’m chiming in with kimsia in the recollection that “a higher stage does not inherently make you a better person”. And, maybe, recalling that stage theories are models …

Your final sentence fragment is exactly the point I was trying to make....

My apologies for the “violence.” Of course, categorisations of particular discourse styles as “violent” is also modelling-on-the-fly. There is also a school of thought, that I share, that, e.g. broadening the domain of reference of a word like “violence” to encompass fairly innocent verbal behaviour does “violence” to the common ground of conversation on which we all depend for understanding.

The perception of “violence” felt in response to words is pretty reliably a guide to the internals of the hearer rather than, necessarily, to those of the speaker (in my models). Rosenberg, in my rarely humble opinion, did great violence to honest discourse by choosing the word in so naming Non-Violent Conversation. Wrapped himself fairly comprehensively in a cloak of gentle respectability.

I agree with everything Simon M says in his first paragraph. But I did balk a bit at this claim:

Rosenberg, in my rarely humble opinion, did great violence to honest discourse by choosing the word in so naming Non-Violent Conversation.

I can see how it follows logically from the premises established in paragraph 1. But I also agree with Rosenberg that certain uses of language can violate people’s boundaries, which is why he named it that way. Paradoxically, an accusation that someone’s languages is violent would be an example of what NVC defines as violent communication. Perhaps “Non-Consensual Communication” would be a better phrase?

Coming back to the discussion of stages…

The perception of “violence” felt in response to words is pretty reliably a guide to the internals of the hearer rather than, necessarily, to those of the speaker (in my models).

I suspect it’s probably a perception characteristic stage 3. Since people accusing others of using language violently usually have very little interest in the truth or otherwise of a statement, and place a much higher priority on whether it follows the communal rules (reasonable or otherwise) or disrupts social harmony. As discussed here:

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/exiting-vampire-castle/

I’m sorry to see the follow-on from my use of the word. When I wrote

“I find it very helpful to express it explicitly, but without violence, inviting other perspectives”
my intention was not to accuse anyone of violence, but simply an invitation to reflect on whether the words we use have a(n internal) feeling of linkage to emotion of negative intent, as perhaps may be the case when we are, in IFS terms, speaking as a protector part, rather than the usually more helpful speaking from “self” on behalf of the protector part. And, naturally, protector parts typically respond in a “lower” order.

Agreeing with Danyl above that

an accusation that someone’s languages is violent would be an example of what NVC defines as violent communication
Again, seeing the world through the lens that there is a moral order in which some people are allowed to suppress others feels quite stage 3 to me, too. And calling something stage 3 is (as some points above clarify) is not a moral condemnation. So I have the feeling that it is not helpful to try to determine whether or not a particular form of words is “violent”. What is clearer to me is, from the speaker’s or writer’s self-reflection, did this come from a lower order protector part? And from the hearer’s or reader’s perspective, did these words bring up a protector reaction? In either case, what are the circumstances (quite individual) which lead to lower-order feelings, reactions or responses? If one feels their own boundaries are being transgressed, then I guess they will feel unsafe, or threatened, and so on.

And maybe this whole issue of the developmental stages of parts could be helpful to explore?

Oops, sorry, I didn’t leave a blank line to terminate the quotes!

This exchange on “what constitutes violence/what even is violence/who decides what counts as violence…” is IMO a perfect microcosm of nebulosity in action.

Picture cellular interactions in biology. A sperm and an egg. Commonality and consensus is desired, but there is a border. A barrier? Perhaps, at first. But if it remains a barrier, if the parties close off, wriggle away… shared meaningness is lost.

On the other hand - picture a T-cell and a virus, amoeba and paramecium. If you don’t maintain a barrier against certain interacting parties, you may be in mortal danger of having your insides become outside (or someone else’s insides).

Shared understanding then needs to be a feedback loop - an openness to potentially positive intent from without, plus a true self-interest in merging with other. But it comes, gradually, in tighter and finer detail, as initial violence and border clashes transform into revelations of alternate interpretation, greater context, appreciation for difference, and ultimately mutual shared understanding. A quantum tunnelling - a pop of the idea, transcending the border. Not “through, violently.” Not “into, by way of opening.” A metaphysical shift - the sort needed to ensure that stars can burn, and fusion can actually work, by information transfer cascading back up and out the feedback cycle.

I know this is super poetic and abstruse, but, seriously - I think these phenomena (quantum tunnelling and the acrosome reaction) are literal analogues to the kind of nebulous boundary-crossings/permeations that are at play in the act of human idea exchange.

This has just come to my attention: https://www.sloww.co/stage-theory-nora-bateson/
which seems (at least to my first view) to be a portrayal of Nora Bateson simply rubbishing stage theory in_toto. I hate to see this kind of polarising polemic infecting a useful field of enquiry like this — how might it be possible to create a well-honed response to this? I’m not sure at which level or levels to respond. One may for sure criticize the style and approach and divisiveness; the straw-manning instead of steel-manning … how can we ourselves do a good steel-manning job on Nora and her intermediary here? What, if any, substantial points are there, and have they already been addressed in this very piece above?
Or: set up an actual live conversation going into these matters?

Thanks for this clarification David! My personal inclination is to look for the underlying common ground. It would make sense to me that any particular set of stages or levels (or … ) are culturally normalised responses to dealing with the particular complexities of life encountered in a particular society. I’d love to merge here with the main valid point of Nora Bateson, and I wonder if we could all agree on some kind of fundamentals similar, if not identical, to Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory?

Could we envisage also a kind of super-spiral-dynamics-like theory, where the characteristics of a particular culture have within them the seeds of a particular move to another “level”, in some semi-predictable way? It would be so nice to get underneath the rather flaky spiral dynamics field as well.

Simon Grant:

It would be so nice to get underneath the rather flaky spiral dynamics field as well

… or even getting right away from it. The adoption of Spiral Dynamics is where Ken Wilber and I parted ways. I just can’t see any explanatory value in it that wasn’t already provided by holons, the AQAL matrix, and the progression of “worldviews”. Mind you, many smart people see no explanatory value in those concepts either, and I acknowledge I may be biased against the peculiarly US-conservative interpretation of Spiral Dynamics that seems to be popular. I’m sure SD fans would accuse me of illustrating the “Mean Green Meme” ; )

David Chapman:

A response would be quite complicated, because much of the critique is absolutely correct. Her overall conclusion isn’t, because she’s missing some key points. To add the complexity, she’s grinding a political/moral axe, which leads to several is/ought confusions.

I don’t want to judge Bateson’s take by this summary. She is quoted there as saying “Any label is a reductionism” and I think the same is true of any summary. That doesn’t make it wrong or useless, but it does mean it’s necessarily an incomplete picture. I suspect Bateson’s actual view holds more nuances than such a discourse summary is capable of representing.

But the impression I get from the summary, is the classic pseudo-pomo confusion, addressed by both Ken Wilber and David Graeber in different ways. For example:

“Measuring developmental goals or stages is a mistake. Different people have different perceptions of different complexities.”

This is, as David says, is mostly a moral claim. To the degree it’s a factual one, it’s empirically wrong.

Some people understand that you can’t pour 1.2 litres of water into a 1 litre jug, no matter how how clever you are, nor hard you work. Some people cannot. Or rather, when you look at a more complex real world example that follows the same logic (eg 120,000 unemployed people pursuing 100,000 available jobs), they can’t.

As David says, this difference doesn’t make either person inferior or superior in any moral or political sense. But it does mean that one has a useful capability the other does not, which makes them for qualified to do certain kinds of work (eg welfare or employment relations policy). To pretend such differences don’t exist, because it’s not politically correct for them to exist, is the thinking of the apocryphal ostrich.

To add another dimension or aspect to this exploration of stage theories and their hazards … Having come across George Kelly and Personal Construct Theory many years ago (and been highly impressed) I wondered if we could press his ideas into further useful service.

My idea, or rather research question, is this: to what extent can we take different stage theories as the natural outworking of the human (as in Kelly) tendency for personal construct systems to move by jumps, rather than by gradual smooth evolution. (And talking of evolution, there’s a parallel…)

Most clearly perhaps, Kegan contextualises his “orders of consciousness” against the background of the “modern” world. But, it seems obvious and clear to me that if a human had no contact with the “modern” and “post-modern” worlds that are familiar to many of us, why would a Kelly-like developmental process lead to Kegan’s scheme?

I was just revisiting the Eden Project the other day, and reflecting that the rainforest is such a hugely complex biome, it would take me years (probably including formative years) to become familiar with it. Hence, so much indigenous knowledge / wisdom. The Mediterranean biome is so much less complex … no wonder “Western” philosophy and culture grew up around the Med. (And California ;-) )

Ultimately, I could even imagine an AI (or, perhaps more openly, machine learning) project simulating Kelly-like construct progression in different complex scenarios, leading to what could be a fascinating simulation of human developmental stages.

Maybe this could feed into one of your future pieces, David? I’d be happy to collaborate.

browsing around, I found what seems to me a good short intro to Kelly here, for those unfamiliar… https://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/kelly.html